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ollowing the bankruptcy of the oil giant Yukos by the Russian Federation in 2004 on grounds of 
alleged tax evasion, the majority shareholders GML (originally Group Menatep Limited), 
together with the Yukos pension fund, filed an arbitration suit against the Russian Federation. 
The suit was filed under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the world’s only multilateral investment 
treaty. GML relied on the investor protection provisions of the ECT to argue that it had been 
expropriated and sought recovery for all losses, which may well top $100 billion. The Russian 
Federation argued that the ECT did not apply as Russia had signed but not ratified the Charter. 
However, fatally for its case, Russia had accepted provisional application of the Treaty from the date of 
signature. It was on this basis that the arbitrators held that the ECT applied in full to Russia. There is 
now expected to be a hearing on the merits of the case in the next couple of years. At first sight this 
ruling looks like a pyrrhic victory for Yukos, particularly after the Russian withdrawal from provisional 
application of the Charter in October. However, on closer examination, this ECT case is likely to have a 
significant impact on the EU-Russia energy relationship for at least the next two decades, and may well 
result in the Russian Federation reconsidering its approach to the Charter.  
It could at first sight be argued that the 30
th November decision in favour of Yukos shareholders under 
the investor protection provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty in GML v. Russian Federation is the 
pyrrhic victory of pyrrhic victories. And at first sight the ruling on jurisdiction in favour of the Yukos 
shareholders in respect of a $100 billion claim for expropriation does look like it will not have much real 
world effect. Sceptical commentators can argue that while the ruling may improve the morale of Yukos 
shareholders, this decision is not going to result in any payment by Russia for the expropriation of Yukos 
assets. It of course true that enforcement of any final ruling in Russia would be problematic to say the 
least. However, that does not mean that the GML ruling does not provide a vital first step to recovery for 
the shareholders. It is also clear that the ruling has a significant broader impact on the EU-Russian energy 
relationship. 
While recovery of any assets would be extremely difficult in Russia, if a final decision on the merits in 
the shareholders’ favour is handed down (no final ruling is expected for at least two years) it could be 
enforced outside Russia. Ironically the political and industrial strategy adopted by former President, now 
Prime Minister Putin, over the last decade makes execution against Russian assets easier than many 
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investment cases against sovereign states. The principal assets owned by most states outside its own 
jurisdiction are diplomatic, cultural and military assets – all protected by sovereign immunity. However, 
the strategy adopted by Premier Putin has been to acquire significant state shareholdings in a range of 
Russian energy and commodity businesses, and then encourage those firms to go on to acquire 
significant overseas assets. This strategy may well permit firms like Gazprom to capture more of the 
energy value chain and increase Russian commercial and political influence. Unfortunately by creating 
classes of assets outside Russia that are owned by state-owned Russian companies that are not able to 
benefit from sovereign immunity, the Kremlin has created attractive targets for seizure by Yukos 
shareholders. Execution could be enforced against Russian assets in any court in Europe or North 
America with a significant chance of success. One of the first effects of the jurisdiction ruling is likely to 
be a greater degree of Russian caution as to where and how state-owned Russian energy companies 
invest. For example, it is very doubtful that we will now hear any more discussion of Gazprom acquiring 
British energy company Centrica. 
The broader legal implications of the case focus on the ruling of the panel that the Russian Federation is 
bound by Article 45(1) of the ECT. Article 45(1) provides for provisional application of the Charter from 
date of signature. Provisional application is a well-known procedure under international law, which 
allows states to benefit from the immediate legal effect of treaties without waiting for the often laborious 
and politically fraught process of ratification.  
Despite a strong Russian defence, the Russian position was always vulnerable to legal challenge. One 
major point overlooked in the debates over the application of the Charter to Russia was that Article 45(1) 
was a voluntary provision. The Russian Federation did not have to accept Article 45(1). Indeed, Norway 
refused to accept Article 45(1) and was never in fact provisionally bound by the ECT. By accepting that 
the ECT would be fully legally binding from signature and thereby make the provisions on investor 
protection contained in the Charter fully applicable to Russia, it hoped that foreign investment would 
flow into the country.   
It could however be argued that, notwithstanding this finding, the decision cannot have any broader 
effect because in July the Russian Federation formally withdrew its consent to provisional application. 
This came into force on 19
th October, and therefore from that date the Russian Federation is no longer 
bound by provisional application rules of the Charter. 
While this withdrawal does have legal effect on all new energy investments made after 19
th October, it 
has no effect on all prior investments. Under the legacy provision of the ECT on withdrawal from 
provisional application, the binding effect of the Charter remains in place for twenty years. In other 
words, the Russian Federation is bound under the investor protection provisions of the ECT for all 
existing investments until 19
th October 2029.  
It is the legacy provision that makes the Yukos decision of 30
th November so significant. As a 
consequence of the GML v. Russian Federation case it is now very clear that Russia is fully bound by the 
ECT for all energy investments made prior to 19
th October 2009. As a consequence, the decision has 
significantly strengthened the legal protection of a wide range of European companies with energy 
investments in Russia, from BP, to Shell, to Total, to RWE and E.ON. 
In fact there is a strong case for saying that by withdrawing from provisional application the Russian 
Federation has managed to achieve the worst of all possible worlds. As a result of the GML case it now 
bears the burden of significant investor protection provisions for the next 20 years, while at the same 
time by withdrawing from the ECT it has thrown away the advantage of encouraging new investment 
gained by full compliance with the Charter. 
In respect of the GML case itself, it is likely that ultimately neither side will actually want the 
embarrassment or media frenzy of the execution of arrest warrants of Russian assets all over North 
America and Europe, and a private settlement will be arrived at. 
However, the broader predicament created by the ruling, combined with Russia’s need for capital in the 
energy sector, is likely to result in a reconsideration in Moscow of the Russian approach to investor 
protection and the ECT. The numbers are compelling. The International Energy Agency estimated that 
the Russian Federation needed to invest $157 billion in new generating capacity, and approximately $200 
billion in new electricity transmission networks. It is not only in the electricity sector that huge sums and 
high oil prices – well beyond the means of Russia – are required. In the gas market, to open up major The Yukos Decision: Profound Implications for the EU-Russia Energy Relationship? | 3 
new gas fields such as Yamal, Cambridge Energy Research Associates estimate that Gazprom needs to 
invest approximately $200 billion, most of which is upfront in the building of roads and pipelines across 
Siberia, before a single molecule of gas can reach consumers. 
Furthermore, domestic sources of capital are likely to be limited. The domestic Russian banking system 
prior to the financial crisis was unable to provide the scale of capital required to develop the natural gas 
and oil sectors. The Russian energy majors relied on their own cash flows and foreign capital. Given the 
damage suffered by Russian banks in the crisis, it is difficult to see how those banks are going to be able 
to act as a major source of capital to the energy sector. It is also difficult to see how the energy majors 
such as Gazprom can easily generate the cash themselves on the scale necessary to complete the 
investment and infrastructure projects it needs to keep the gas supply flowing. Gazprom particularly has 
difficulties, as it is dragged down by $40 billion of corporate debt and is facing significant and 
potentially long-lasting gas to gas competition. 
One option for Russia is to argue for an ECT Plus, which recognises key Russian interests. Russia does 
have significant leverage that it can bring to bear to reform the ECT in return for compliance with its 
core rules in terms of market access to Russian energy markets. The Russian Federation should be able to 
negotiate a revised ECT which, while it recognises investor protection rules, gives Russia and the 
European Union (now granted partial competence under the Lisbon Treaty amendments in relation to 
investor protection rules) a greater role in the development of the ECT.  
For any state so dependent on energy resources for export income as Russia, a multilateral investment 
treaty such as the ECT is vital. Without such a treaty foreign capital is far less likely to be willing to 
invest and the transit of energy products to market is insecure. It may well be time, following the GML 
ruling for Moscow, to rethink the approach it has been taking to the Charter and its broader energy 
relationship with the European Union. 